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Abstract 
This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual 
settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information 
rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. 
The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings 
(2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure 
peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. 
The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological 
rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the 
strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon 
bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted 
during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is 
discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game 
(informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making 
by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of 
elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be 
invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the 
paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland 
electoral history over the last 25 years.  
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1. Introduction 
The extent to which we observe the existence of group conflict is heavily determined 
by the choice of group representatives. Whether conflict is based on class, 
nationalism, religion (or ethnicity in general) there usually exists a choice of 
leadership which is either moderate/dove or extreme/hawk. It is generally thought that 
the selection of hawks is a major cause of  conflict and it is often lamented (especially 
by those viewing from the outside) that if only the groups involved could disregard 
their emotions and think rationally, they would choose moderate leaders who would 
more likely find a resolution and establish cooperative institutions. Similarly, if peace 
agreements have somehow been forged it is often the hope of the outside world that 
group identities will break down and divisive societies will integrate. It is frustrating 
when cooperative institutions sometimes seem to lead to a heavier selection of hawks 
rather than doves thus undermining further integration. 
The approach of this paper is that of a rational choice/economic attempt to analyse the 
effect of group heterogeneity (in terms of group members’ attitudes towards the other 
group) and the nature of individual group member’s motivation when selecting the 
leader who will represent the group. These are topics that the economic approach to 
conflict has tended to neglect. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and (more briefly) 
Skaperdas (2006) provide a comprehensive overview of this literature. The baseline 
model is a game in three stages. In stage one, homogenous groups (so they can be 
treated as a single agent) decide upon their investment in guns versus butter. Gun 
production reduces butter and thus utility. The investment in guns determines the 
probability that the group will succeed in a contest with other groups, if such a contest 
were to arise. In stage two, negotiation takes place and if this fails conflict will occur 
in stage three. The baseline model has provided considerable light on the costs of 
conflict (even when it does not occur), rational reasons for conflict to exist and the 
application of the model to areas such as trade and security. The model has also been 
relaxed to allow for strategic interaction amongst group members. The key lesson of 
this analysis of inter and intra group competition is that we can expect to see free-
riding in group activity in the contest between groups where the gains are public, but 
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greater effort to acquire the spoils of a successful conflict if the gains are allowed to 
be private. 
The analysis of this paper diverges from the core literature by taking a different 
perspective on intra-group strategic interaction and thus the underlying motivation of 
group members when making their choice of group leader. In the rationales to be 
discussed we drop the assumption that group members are homogenous in their 
preferences and that the underlying motive for group activity is necessarily to acquire 
the resources belonging to the other side. In most conflicts there tends to be a 
distribution of preferences with regard to the depth of feeling of group identity or the 
level of antipathy towards opposing groups. Furthermore, conflicts do not always 
appear to be economically motivated. Conflicts may arise when there is no (or at least 
no obvious) attempt to acquire resources, but rather to impose ideology or compete 
over identity. The survey of possible rational rationales developed here will, we hope, 
address to some extent these two lacunae in the existing literature. 
By considering intra-group competition as a determinant of the degree to which we 
observe inter-group conflict, the paper is close in spirit to the work of Bueno de 
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (2002), Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and 
Morrow (2003) and for an overview Bueno de Mesquita (2006). This approach, which 
we might label the ‘domestic perspective’ attempts to move away from structural 
theories of international relations which treat nations as organic units and ignores the 
effect of domestic politics on foreign policy. They argue that domestic politics, in 
fact, has a major impact upon the interaction between countries. This is certainly the 
case in the rationales to be studied in this paper and we extend this reasoning beyond 
nations to interactions between groups in general and where intra-group competition 
has major effects. 
The intra-group competition we focus on is that between moderates and extremists. 
We review four economic theories that attempt to make sense of leadership selection 
in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) we label 
the information rationale, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate 
peace agreements. The second labeled the bargaining rationale borrowing from 
Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more 
likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be 
rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) we label the 
social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which 
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group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not 
impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be 
predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, we discuss the 
expressive rationale which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the 
game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-
making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the 
outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions 
which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or 
peaceful. In each of the rationales we look at the implications for inter-group conflict 
and make some simple welfare judgements. The political situation in Northern Ireland 
provides an opportunity to apply the analysis. We discuss how the rationales link to 
the relatively recent history of Northern Ireland and a sample of the literature that has 
been analysing it. 
It should be noted at the outset that the rationales to be discussed here have all been 
published. To that end, the novelty of this paper is not by presenting fresh theories. 
Rather, the novelty is in the collection of the rationales and their application to the 
case of Northern Ireland (though it is hoped that the application is more general than 
that). However, revisiting the rationales does allow the opportunity to present them in 
more simplified forms and in some cases to explore issues not addressed in the 
original versions. 
 
2. The Information Rationale 
Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) set out to explain why some major policy initiatives 
are taken by seemingly the least likely policy makers. They discuss major free market  
reforms taken by left-wing parties, but of direct relevance to this paper they also 
discuss the pursuit of peace deals by politicians associated with being hawks. The title 
of their paper gives one example of Nixon opening the way to cooperate with China. 
Another example they provide is the peace deal forged between Israel and Egypt by 
Begin and Sadat, both considered to be hawks. 
The logic of their argument is as follows. Within any nation (and we extend the notion 
to groups in general) there may exist hawk and dove parties. Either of these will be 
dominant at a particular point in time and will either be the incumbent power, or could 
be treated as such. All parties are assumed to have two goals. First, they want to win 
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elections. Second, they are outcome oriented and wish to implement policies that 
provide their ideal outcomes. However, polices and outcomes are not perfectly 
mapped. Occasionally, for example, a hawk may find that pursuing a dovish policy is 
more conducive to achieving their hawkish goal. 
Assume that there is a hawk incumbent and that they have received a signal that a 
dovish policy is optimal to achieve a hawkish end. The incumbent hawk must weigh 
two counteracting effects. By pursuing a dovish policy, voters are sent a signal that 
dovish policies might work better. The median voter will form the expectation that if 
a hawk is pursuing a dovish policy then an implication is that an even more dovish 
policy may be required to achieve the goals of the median voter. This makes the hawk 
less electable and they call this the ‘expectations effect’. On the other hand, by 
moving towards the dovish policy they move towards the median voters making them 
more electable. They label this the ‘Hotelling effect’. From the perspective of voters 
there are two random effects that they cannot observe directly. These are the mapping 
of policy into outcome and party ideology. Cukierman and Tomassi argue that 
political parties tend to be coalitions of various interest groups, any of which may be 
more or less influential within the party at any point in time in a way that is not clear 
to the voter.  
The key result is the following. When the variance of party ideology is greater than 
the variance of the mapping of policy into outcomes, the hawk incumbent is more 
electable because the Hotelling effect is greater than the expectations effect. In other 
words, the moderation shown by the hawk party is attractive to voters given the 
spread of opinion they believe exists within that party. They form the view that the 
moderate wing of the party is winning. This is combined with the view that it is less 
likely that the stance is driven by the hawk incumbent receiving dovish signals. The 
conclusion is that under these circumstances, extreme dovish policies are more likely 
to be implemented by hawks. Were the incumbent a dove and they implement 
extreme dovish policies, this will be interpreted as a swing to the extreme dove end of 
the party and will make them less electable. In order to win the election, the dovish 
party would be well advised to hide the signal. A hawk incumbent would have no 
such concern because they know that the peace agreement they would make would be 
viewed as credible. 
So this analysis overturns the conventional wisdom. It should be noted that if the 
expectation effect outweighs the Hotelling effect then a dove incumbent would find it 
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electorally profitable to implement extreme dovish policy. The pursuit of such 
policies therefore depends on the identity of the incumbent party, the mix of 
preferences within it and the nature of the signals received by the public. As we shall 
see, in the Northern Ireland case, it also depends on whether the incumbent is willing 
to take major risks with regard to retaining power. In Cukierman and Tomassi’s 
analysis the nature of any peace agreement is not explored, but presumably we may 
expect the identity of negotiators to influence what sort of deal (if any emerges). This 
leads naturally to a discussion of the bargaining rationale. 
 
3. The Bargaining Rationale 
Cukierman and Tomassi assume the existence of a dove and a hawk and don't model 
the possible entry of centrists into the electoral competition. If they did, one might be 
tempted, according to the median voter theorem, to think that a centrist party (neither 
hawk nor dove) will win. In the following two sections we shall see that this is not 
true if we model voters as choosing strategically. The median voter will want the 
political outcome to be located at her ideal point, however, given the nature of the 
political game achieving this goal may be better served by selecting a leader with a 
preference different to her own. Indeed, given a lack of information the previous 
section has shown us that the median voter may prefer an extreme hawk to make a 
peace agreement in order to render it credible. A large literature now exists on the role 
of strategic delegation in political settings. Examples are Chari, Jones and Marimon 
(1997) who use strategic delegation to explain the practice of split-ticket voting in the 
US, Persson and Tabellini (1992) who predict that more liberal representatives would 
be elected to counter the effect of the tax base being reduced through increased tax 
competition in Europe following the increased integration of 1992, and Besley and 
Coate (1997) use strategic delegation to endogenize leadership in their citizen 
candidate model. 
We provide a simplified version of the analysis in Hamlin and Jennings (2007) to 
study the bargaining rationale for leadership selection in conflict. Assume that all 
members of a population have joined one of two groups that formed out of a 
population whose ideal points in policy space are distributed uniformly on [ ]0,1 . We 
now use a two-stage game to depict leadership selection. In stage 1 of the game a 
leader is selected where there is an available potential leader across the full spectrum 
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of the group, taking the choice of leader by the other group as given. In stage 2 
leaders choose their mode of interaction and the social outcome is determined. As 
usual, it is appropriate to consider these stages in reverse order to find subgame 
perfect equilibria of the game. 
 
3.1 Stage 2 - The Game of Political Interaction 
Whichever leaders emerge in each group, and however they emerge, they will find 
themselves playing a stage game against the opposing leader which will determine the 
overall outcome for members of both groups. We endogenise the choice of the form 
of the interaction between groups - whether violent conflict (con) or peaceful 
compromise (com). If both leaders choose conflict, we assume, initially, that the 
political outcome is exactly the same as it would have been if they both agreed to 
compromise - a weighted sum of the two leaders policy preferences - but that both 
groups carry a cost of conflict. This reflects the idea that conflict may not be decisive 
in determining the political outcome, but is always costly. This is a sharply different 
assumption to the standard one where a contest success function is used and one of 
the groups will emerge as winner. However, stalemate is both a realistic depiction of 
many conflicts in reality and we will argue potentially increases the level of conflict 
costs that may be incurred. 
1L  and  are the locations or ideal points of the leaders of group 1 and 2 respectively 
and, without loss of generality, we take to be to the left of , with 
2L
1L 2L ( )1 2L L L= − . 
We consider the case where the groups are of equal size and strength  (encompassing 
[0, ½) and (½, 1]) and we refer the reader to Hamlin and Jennings (2007) for the case 
of asymmetric groups. The political outcome is given by 1 2 2L L 2+  and the payoff 
to each leader is indicated in terms of the distance from the political outcome to the 
leaders’ ideal points and conflict costs should they be incurred.  
The exogenous cost of conflict is indicated by v . To hold  exogenous runs contrary 
to the general spirit of conflict/rent-seeking models as outlined in the introduction. 
These models focus on endogenising the cost of conflict in terms of resources used for 
guns rather than butter production in anticipation of/or use on conflict. Nonetheless, 
these models also often include a predictable, exogenous cost of conflict given by the 
destruction of resources. We view  in this way, as an expected cost of conflict, but 
one that is symmetrically perceived. This allows a simplified approach where we can 
v
v
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focus on leadership selection and the choice between conflict or peace given an 
exogenous conflict cost. We would also argue that for many conflicts the idea that the 
cost of conflict is fully incurred after the conflict has been initiated is realistic. The 
gun versus butter decision focuses on costs incurred in anticipation of conflict. We 
draw attention to the idea that if leaders can be found who would agree on peace then 
it is possible that no conflict costs need be incurred at all. 1 
We analyse the following game 
 com con 
com 
2
,
2
LL  
vL −,  
con Lv,−  vLvL −−
2
,
2
 
 
Figure 1 The Game of Political Interaction  
 
The key point here is that a prisoner’s dilemma may emerge with conflict a dominant 
strategy for each player. This will be the case if: 
 ( )2 112 L L v− ≥  (1) 
however if 
 ( )2 112 L L v− ≤  (2) 
compromise will be the dominant strategy for each player. 
 
 
3.2 Stages 1 - Choosing the Leader 
The potential leader must be the Condorcet winner - that is the winner in a straight 
contest with any other candidate - and thus the choice of the median member of the 
                                                 
1 There has been a recent paper by Brandauer and Englmaier (2006) that extends the contest success 
function to include heterogeneous preferences. This is clearly an approach close to the one taken here 
and it might be argued with the added advantage of retaining the central concern with the guns versus 
butter decision. They find that, in equilibrium, contests are fought between asymmetric leaders (radical 
and less radical) and that there is lower overall spending on guns compared to non-strategic decision-
making. In their paper, the contest certainly occurs. The possibility of choosing leaders to avoid 
conflict is a crucial difference in the approach made by Hamlin and Jennings. However, the finding on 
the selection of asymmetric leaders is mirrored for certain parameter values and that strategically 
selected leaders can contain costs compared to median voters sincerely selecting themselves or 
choosing leaders expressively.   
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group. The median member of group 1 would be the member located at 1/4. We 
assume that this member, like all group members, knows the payoffs in the game of 
political interaction to be played as stage 2, and the value of . The chosen leader of 
group 1 will then be the best response to the type of leader selected by group 2. The 
optimal choice of  (ignoring v for now) is given by 
v
1L 1 1 2 2LoptL = − , such that 
. Since01 ≥L 2 1 2L > ,  and, a similar argument implies that .01 =optL 12 =optL 2 
Note that leaders located at 0 and 1 would always be chosen by the median members 
of their respective groups if the game of political interaction were replaced by a 
simple compromise with the rival leader. Thus, extremists are always preferred as 
leaders in respect of their ability to deliver the most advantageous compromise. 
However, 0 and 1 are also the most likely leadership locations to bring about conflict 
rather than compromise. Group members, therefore, face a choice between a leader 
located at 0 (1) with the certainty of conflict, and a leader who is the most left-wing 
(right-wing) member of the group who would compromise. All leaders other than 
these two would clearly be dominated. For the median member of group 1 located at 
1/4 to choose a leader who would compromise, it must be the case that 
 ( ) ( )( )2 11 1 1 104 2 4 2 comL v L L− + − ≤ − + 2  (3) 
where  is any given leader chosen by group 2 and  is the location of the most 
left wing compromiser, (3) reduces to 
2L ( )comL1
 ( )1
1
2 com
v L≥  (4) 
In turn, for group 2 to be willing to choose a leader who would compromise, it must 
be that for their median voter (located at approximately 3/4) 
 ( ) ( )( )1 21 3 112 4 2 comL v L L+ − − ≤ + −1 34  (5) 
This reduces to 
 ( )2
1 1
2 2 com
v L− ≤  (6) 
For two compromise leaders to emerge, (4) and (6) must both hold. We can now make 
some conclusions about what sort of leaders will emerge, given differing values of v . 
                                                 
42 This follows by noting that ideally for 1/  and 3 , 4 1 22 2optL L1 4 = +  and 
1 23 4 2 2L optL= +  
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• When 0=v , there is by definition no cost associated with conflict, so that conflict 
is irrelevant to decision making. 1L  and 2L  will be located at 0 and 1, and there 
will be conflict. 
• As v increases from 0 up to 1 6v = , 0 and 1 will continue to be the equilibrium 
leaders and positive conflict costs will be incurred which follows from solving (2), 
(4) and (6) simultaneously. To see this note that it will not be possible to find 
values for 1L  and 2L  such that (4) and (6) will hold. For instance, assume 1.0=v , 
for (4) to hold it must be that 12.0 L≥ . However, any individual located at 
approximately 0.2 would not choose a compromise strategy against any leader that 
group 2 may choose. As such group 1 would choose 0 as leader and in response 
group 2 would choose 1. Therefore, conflict would ensue. Note that the essential 
reason for this outcome is that v is too low for the cost of conflict to 
counterbalance the benefits from extreme leaders in terms of their influence on 
outcomes. 
• For values of v between approximately1 6 1 4v< < , multiple equilibria exist. For 
instance at 2.0=v , 0.3 would be willing to compromise against 0.7. If we plug the 
values into (4) and (6), both equations hold. However, note that the best response 
to the choice of 1 as 2L , would be for group 1 to choose 0; similarly, if 0 is elected 
by group 1, group 2 will elect 1. Multiple equilibria exist, one of which is 
conflictual - the election of extremists at 0 and 1. This raises the problem of 
coordination between the two groups when choosing leaders. 
• For 1 4v = , conflict disappears in equilibrium and at least one leader is not 
extreme. At 1 4v = , member 0.25 is indifferent between voting for 0.5 or 0 against 
1. At conflict costs higher than 0.25, the compromise leader would always win in 
response to any leader selected by the other group. Although there remain multiple 
equilibria, none will be conflictual. 
• 1 2v > , there will be no conflict and the groups will select extremists as their 
leaders. In this case, no leader will actually choose conflict as a strategy in stage 3. 
The social outcome will be ( )122/1 LL −  and therefore 0 would be the preferred 
leadership location of the median member of group 1, no matter which leader 
group 2 elects. The same logic applies to group 2. Thus, 1L and 2L  will be located 
at 0 and 1. 
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Three main conclusions emerge. First, extremist leaders always provide the best 
political outcome from the perspective of the median members of the groups if 
conflict costs are ignored.3 Thus when conflict costs are low, extremist leaders will 
emerge. But the relationship between conflict costs and the position of leaders is not 
monotonic. As conflict costs rise, the probability of extreme leaders falls, but if 
conflict costs rise beyond a threshold level (0.5) conflict is so costly that even extreme 
leaders will avoid it, so that extreme leaders will reappear. Second, the costliest 
conflict that will emerge in equilibrium arises when 1 4v = , and is below the level of 
conflict cost that would be suffered if groups always followed the simple rule of 
appointing extremist leaders. Third, equilibria involving compromise can emerge at 
relatively modest levels of conflict cost, for 1 6v > . This should be compared against 
the idea that the median voters always select themselves. In this case conflict would 
exist up to  or the costs that could be incurred if leaders were selected 
expressively which will be the subject of section 5. 
4/1=v
In Hamlin and Jennings conflict was treated as stalemate and that this would be the 
certain outcome. Contest success functions model conflict as being completely 
decisive, but with uncertainty over the identity of the winner. The possibility of 
decisiveness was not explored in the original paper, but it would be instructive to 
revise the results of this section in the light of assuming decisive conflict rather than 
stalemate. The payoffs in Figure 1 will remain the same except that those in (con, 
con) are probabilistic with regard to the political outcome. There is a 50/50 chance 
that the political outcome will be at  or . Assuming the leaders are risk neutral, 
equations (1) and (2) hold as before. The change comes in the behaviour of the 
median voters. Clearly if there is to be conflict they are better choosing themselves 
than extremists. Equation (3) must now be amended to 
1L 2L
 ( )(2 11 1 1 12 4 4 2 comL v L L⎛ ⎞− − ≤ − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ )2  (7) 
which reduces to 
 ( )1
1
2 8com
v L≥ 1−
                                                
 (8) 
equation (5) now becomes 
 
3 This is not true when groups are highly asymmetric in size and strength, see Hamlin and Jennings for 
details. 
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 ( )( )1 21 3 12 4 2 comL v L L⎛ ⎞− − ≤ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ 1 34  (9) 
which reduces to 
 ( )2
3 1
8 2 com
L v− <  (10) 
We now find that solving for (2), (8) and (10) simultaneously means that conflict will 
only exist with certainty up to 1 12v = . Decisiveness prevents delegation to 
extremists and this in turn contains conflict costs. 
Whether the nature of conflict is represented as decisive or non-decisive we might 
wish to consider the implications of a peace agreement. This would suggest the (com, 
com) profile, which in turn (for the case of fairly equally sized or powerful groups) 
would imply the selection of extremists. Given that v is the only source of welfare loss 
in this model, a political outcome of cooperation with groups led by extremists is 
efficient as v does not exist. 
 
4. The Social Psychological Rationale 
Underlying the previous two sections is the idea that the political interaction between 
groups is driven by disputes over resources or political power more generally. The 
information rationale was vague on the details of bargaining for the very reason that 
voters cannot directly observe the nature of any deal. Hawks pursuing peace will be 
attractive when it makes the potential deal credible. The bargaining rationale is 
explicit and straightforward. Given a political outcome that is an average of the 
positions of the leaders, it makes sense for the median voter to select an extremist in 
order to achieve a favourable distribution of political power. The problem is that 
choosing extremists may cause conflict and therein lies the trade-off.  
So both models, explicitly or implicitly, suggest that hawk selection trades political 
power against peace and when peace is secured hawk selection dominates the 
selection of doves. How realistic a depiction of group conflict is this? In some 
circumstances one might expect the selection of leadership to have little or no effect 
upon the distribution of power. This might simply be determined by the relative 
strength of the groups regardless of the choice of leader. In this case, there would 
appear to be little benefit in choosing any but the most moderate leader since that 
would more likely bring peace at no cost in terms of lost power. 
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In this section we aim to provide a different reason for selecting doves in one type of 
institutional environment and selecting hawks in another one. This picks up on the 
work of social psychologists that has provided a focus on competition over identity as 
the source of conflict. The pioneering work was Tajfel (1981) and Brown (2000, 
chapter 8) provides an overview of the literature. The key insight is that disputes can 
arise between groups even when there is no obvious basis for it in terms of disputes 
over resources or political power. Groups compete to establish superior identities and 
this competition can be very costly and spill over into violence. 
Such a perspective on group conflict seems to move some distance from the standard 
perspective of economists and may even be viewed by some as irrational. Economists 
have though become comfortable with the analysis of status competition or ‘keeping 
up with the Joneses’ (KUJ) where individuals compete over conspicuous consumption 
(see Frank (1985) for a pioneering work). Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) take the 
idea of KUJ and argue that groups may compete over conspicuous public goods 
(CPGs). 
In a non-cooperative state investment in the contest for identity may prove to be very 
costly either in terms of resources used today in the production of conspicuous public 
goods or the anticipation of future conflict costs caused by provocative actions today. 
A first-best solution (in the presence of such externalities) would seem to be 
centralised decision-making between the group leaders who agree to provide the 
optimal amount of CPG within their groups. This idea is a standard one in the 
literature on federalism and the degree of externality provides the basis for deciding 
which goods should be produced at a centralised level. Besley and Coate (2003) argue 
that the political process can produce perverse results. When the cost of local public 
good production is to be shared between two jurisdictions it makes sense for voters in 
each jurisdiction to select leaders with strong preferences for local public goods as 
they will be subsidised by the other group. The political process, in this way, 
undermines the benefits of internalising positive externalities by causing spending to 
be excessive. Dur and Roelfsema (2005) provide an alternative institutional 
arrangement such that costs are non-shareable. In this case politicians with weak 
preferences for local public goods will be elected as the group attempts to free-ride on 
public good provision by the other group. In this case, the distortion caused by 
strategic delegation would be towards under-provision. 
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Jennings and Roelfsema therefore treat the provision of CPGs as subject to a political 
process, such that groups can either cooperate or not and leaders are selected in 
response to the institutional arrangements. By looking at non-shareable cost, in the 
centralised case they find that (as the result above suggests) hawks are selected so as 
to free-ride on the restraint shown by the other group (recall that CPGs produce 
negative externalities). This potentially undermines the benefits of centralisation. This 
is especially the case since in the decentralised case we should expect strategic 
delegation to doves as voters anticipate the destructive nature of the KUJ contest. 
Therefore, in societies where conflict is driven by competition over identity and 
voters choose strategically then cooperative institutions may simply lead to greater 
extremism  and thus prevents the elimination of welfare loss (due to continuing 
overinvestment in CPGs). This provides a nice contrast with the ‘bargaining rationale’ 
where the rational selection of extremists in cooperative institutions is of no concern 
normatively as 0v = , and v is the only source of inefficiency. This captures the 
‘common sense’ understanding that even when cooperative institutions have been 
agreed the potential for costs (other than conflict costs) to continue may still be deeply 
ingrained. 
We will now provide a brief model which formalises the above discussion. We use a 
fairly specific utility function, for a presentation using a more general representation 
and a more detailed discussion see Jennings and Roelfsema. 
 
4.1 The Model 
Consider two groups indexed by i, each inhabited by a continuum of citizens j. The 
typical citizen has a utility function of: 
 ( ) ( ), , , ,j ji i i i iU g g y cg h g g jλ λ− = − + −  (11) 
where  are the CPGs in group i and ig ig−  are CPGs in group -i, y  is income that is 
identical for all individuals, c  is the constant marginal production costs of a unit of 
 (so that ig iy cg−
0,h h
 is the consumption of private goods), and  is the preference 
parameter for public goods. For the h-function we assume the following derivative 
properties: . In the following, we will consider the case where 
CPGs are strategic complements such that . This captures the KUJ effect, as 
0>jλ
0,i i λ−> < > 0h
12 0h >
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the marginal utility of public goods in group i increases in the level of public goods in 
group -i. For simplicity, we propose the following utility function. 
 ( )logj ji i i iV g g yλ α −= − + icg−  (12) 
We assume that the parameter α is identical for all citizens. This parameter measures 
the extent to which CPGs are strategic complements. A high α means that the 
individual greatly envies CPG provision in the other group. A positive α also means 
that higher CPG provision in the foreign group raises the marginal utility of home 
production of CPGs. Foreign production of CPGs creates a negative externality in the 
home group. Producing one unit of  involves a fixed marginal cost per unit, that for 
simplicity we have normalized so that 
ig
c 1= . As noted above the costs of CPGs should 
be considered broadly. They may entail high level resource costs today, for example, 
building monuments or investing in cultural programmes and so on. Alternatively, a 
provocative speech is effectively free of resource costs today but it may entail high 
expected costs if it leads to violent confrontation.  
Suppose that in a decentralized political system the median voter j m=  is elected as 
policy maker. From the first-order condition of (12) it follows that: 
 1 0
m
mi
i i
i i
g g
g g
λ
iα λα −− − = ⇒ = +−  (13) 
In equilibrium, the level of public goods is: 
 2
1
1 1
m
i ig 2
m
i
αλ λα α −= +− −  (14) 
In the symmetric equilibrium ( )im miλ λ−=  equation (14) reduces to: 
 ( )1
m
i
ig
λ
α= −  (15) 
Clearly, the decentralized equilibrium level of public goods supply is increasing in the 
preferences λ of the median voter and increasing in the level of α. 
To elaborate on the oversupply of local public goods, consider the socially optimal 
level of production m ms iV V V i−= + .4 The first-order conditions for  and  that 
maximize 
ig ig−
sV  are: 
                                                 
4 To be precise, in order to imply that the two median voters leading their groups is socially optimal we 
are assuming normal or uniform distribution of preferences within the two groups. 
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 1 0
m m
s i i
i i i i i
dV
dg g g g g
λ λαα α
−
− −
= − −− − =  (16) 
 1 0
m m
s i i
i i i i i
dV
dg g g g g
λ λαα α
−
− − −
= − −− − =  (17) 
After considerable manipulation we find that in equilibrium: 
 1
1 1
m
i ig
m
i
αλ λα α −= ++ +  (18) 
In the symmetric equilibrium ( mi i
mλ λ−=  and ig g i−= ) equation (18) reduces to: 
 mi ig λ=  (19) 
Clearly, this is identical to the decentralized level of public goods provision when 
0α = , in which case there is no jealousy externality. In this last case, there is no 
`identity' argument for CPGs and both centralized and decentralized provision of 
public goods is socially efficient. 
 
4.2 Strategic Delegation 
With respect to the policy making process, we follow Besley and Coate (2003) in that 
we assume that the median voter strategically delegates policy making to an agent. 
Delegation serves as a commitment to a policy stance that would not be credible when 
the median voter himself would be in office. The set up of the policy making game is 
that in the first stage a policy maker is selected by the median voter taking account of 
how the preferences of this policy maker affect the policy outcome. We assume that 
the median voter can choose from a set of potential policy makers where the optimal 
candidate is interior to this set and is available for office. 
In the second stage the delegate in each group decides on the optimal level of CPGs. 
In this second stage, we consider two alternative policy making environments. In a 
decentralized policy making setting, the delegates non-cooperatively decide on the 
level of CPGS. In a centralized policy making setting, the delegates coordinate their 
policies and maximise joint welfare. 
 
4.2.1 Decentralized equilibrium 
Suppose that the median voter in i has a continuum of candidates with  at her 
disposal for the delegation of policy making. The optimal candidate will solve: 
0diλ >
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( ) ( ), , , ,
0
m
i i j i i ji i i
d d d
i i i i i i
dh g g dh g gdV dg dg dg
d dg d dg d d
λ λ
λ λ λ
− − −
−
i
dλ= + − =  (20) 
From (14) the median voter in i anticipates that the equilibrium provision of public 
goods will be: 
 2
1
1 1
d
i ig 2
d
i
αλ λα α −= +− −  (21) 
 2
1
1 1
d
i ig 2
d
i
αλ λα α− −= +− −  (22) 
Combining (20), (21), and (22) we obtain: 
 2 2
1
1 1
m m m
i i i
d
i i i i i
dV
d g g g g
λ αλ α
2
1
1λ α α α α− −= − =− − − − −α
i
  
From (13) we know that di ig gα λ−− =  so that the optimal preferences of the delegate 
in country i are described by: 
 ( )* 1d mi i 2λ λ α= −  (23) 
This shows that the median voter will delegate leadership to a group member with 
preferences weaker than herself. Using (15), in the symmetric equilibrium public 
goods supply will be: 
 ( )1 mig iα λ= +  (24) 
When compared to the decentralized equilibrium without delegation in (15), the level 
of conspicuous public goods is lower in the presence of strategic delegation. 
However, decentralized public goods supply is too high when compared to the 
socially optimal level. 
 
4.2.2 Centralized equilibrium 
When policies are coordinated at the centralized level, we assume that the delegates 
maximize their joint welfare. However, the delegation decision itself is not 
coordinated. Again the median voter solves (20). Recall also that in equilibrium the 
delegates set policy according to (18). Therefore we find that in equilibrium: 
 1 1 1
1 1
m
mi
id
i i i i i
dV
d g g g g
α αλ
1λ α α α α− −= −− + − + +α=
i
 (25) 
In the symmetric equilibrium from (18) we know that di ig g λ−= =  which gives the 
optimal preferences of the delegate of: 
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 ( )* 1di miλ α λ= +  (26) 
This shows that the median voter will delegate leadership to a group member with 
preferences stronger than herself. In the symmetric equilibrium, public goods supply 
will be: 
 ( )1mi ig λ α= +  (27) 
In this stylized example, delegation to extremists undermines any benefit that may 
have resulted from centralisation. In contrast to the ‘bargaining rationale’, selection of 
extremists does come at a cost even when groups cooperate. 
 
5. The Expressive Rationale 
All three models discussed so far assume that voters select leaders as though they are 
decisive in bringing them into power. This assumes away the problem posed by the 
`paradox of voting'. This paradox tells us that since the probability of determining the 
outcome of any reasonably large-scale election is effectively zero and there is a cost 
to voting, why vote? An argument commonly made (explained in great depth in 
Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) is the idea that the benefit obtained from voting is 
more one of consumption than investment. Voters obtain a direct expressive utility 
from voting, even though it will have no consequential effect upon the outcome of the 
election. 
Does this matter? Following Riker and Ordeshook (1968) one might be tempted to 
say no. They argue that a feeling of duty is an expressive benefit which gets voters to 
the polls, but when they get there they choose instrumentally. If that is the case, the 
instrumental motivation underlying the previous three sections would be unaffected. 
Brennan and Lomasky and Brennan and Hamlin (2000) take a different view. 
Expressive motivation may not only provide sufficient benefit to vote, but also may 
determine how voters vote. There is no particular reason why the choice should be the 
same as that made instrumentally. Since one is not in a position to choose the political 
outcome that would leave them best off, why not instead choose policies or leaders 
that simply make them feel best, even if their choice would not be in their 
instrumental interest. This implies that voting may cease to be strategic and become 
more emotional than calculative. Note though that the underlying reasoning is rational 
since it is based on voters correctly perceiving that voting is non-decisive when they 
express their emotional preference. 
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Hamlin and Jennings explore in detail two possible divergences from instrumental 
choice which would significantly alter the results discussed under the ‘bargaining 
rationale’. The first is that instead of delegation to doves or hawks dependent upon the 
political environment, the median voters may simply select someone with preferences 
the same as her own regardless of the political environment. In terms of the model this 
means that conflict would exist in equilibrium up to 1 4v = , even though from 
1 6v =  compromise equilibria are available. The second is the most worrying. That is 
that extreme hawks may be selected since they provide the strongest definition of 
group identity. This would mean that conflict would exist in equilibrium up to 
1 2v = . In either of the two cases, the weighing of the potential costs of not choosing 
doves is irrelevant as no voter can individually bring these costs into existence 
through exercising their voting choice. A similar analysis can be provided for the 
‘social psychological rationale’. Expressive selection of the median voter would 
provide for the same results as in section 4.1. Expressive selection of extremists 
would worsen the outcomes in (15) and (19), but (19) would no longer represent 
social optimality as  would be set at the level preferred by an extremist. At the 
same time though, centralisation in the presence of expressive extremist choice would 
unambiguously improve welfare.  
ig
A discussion of expressive choice perhaps completes the circle and brings us back to 
the comments made in the opening paragraph of this paper. Perhaps emotions do 
dominate voting choice in conflictual societies, but not because group members do 
not choose rationally, but rather the nature of large group decision-making is not 
conducive to placing instrumental preferences ahead of the expressive. In the next 
section we will provide an additional representation of expressive choice by relating it 
to Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness.5 
 
6. Application to Northern Ireland 
This section will attempt to relate the four rationales to the recent history of Northern 
Ireland. In particular, we will make use of election results. Northern Ireland provides 
an excellent case study. There has been a long-lasting conflict between two 
                                                 
5 The depiction of expressive choice in this paper is a negative one. This need not be the case and in 
other circumstances expressive choice could be viewed as a force for good. See Brennan and Hamlin 
(1999) for such an example. 
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communities, there is very little cross-community voting, each community contains 
relatively moderate and extreme parties and there has been a major constitutional 
change (the 1998 Agreement) that entails greater political cooperation between the 
communities.  
First, it would be useful to try and summarise what the four rationales would predict 
• The ‘information rationale’ is itself rich in the level of information contained 
within it. It requires information on the variance of the incumbent party ideology 
and the mapping of policies into outcomes. Recall that when the variance of the 
former outweighs the variance of the latter, only hawks will find it electorally 
profitable to pursue extreme dovish policies as they will be trusted. Clearly it is 
very difficult to get detail on these two dimensions, but nonetheless we will argue 
that Cukierman and Tomassi’s theory may throw some interesting light on 
electoral history in Northern Ireland. 
• The ‘bargaining rationale’ is also extremely difficult to test as we lack an estimate 
of v. However, the 1998 Agreement did signal a move towards cooperative 
institutions between relatively equal groups. As such, the prediction is that 
moderates (for at least one of the groups) would be more likely to be selected pre-
Agreement and extremists selected post-Agreement. We should also distinguish 
between the nature of extremist selection in this rationale versus that in the 
information rationale. In the latter, the reason hawks are attractive is because there 
is considerable variance in party ideology. Therefore, when they sound moderate it 
may be partly explained by the fact that the party actually does contain an 
influential, relatively moderate wing. In the bargaining rationale, there is no 
uncertainty for voters. Extremists are extremists and when they agree a moderate 
compromise it is simply as a result of the bargaining process. 
• The ‘social psychological rationale’ also predicts moderation pre-Agreement and 
extremism post-Agreement. The reason is related, but different to the bargaining 
rationale in that negotiation post-Agreement is not about the distribution of 
political power but limiting the contest over identity. In contrast to the bargaining 
rationale we find the persistence of inefficiency in a centralised agreement. In the 
discussion to follow we will relate this to the idea of ‘ethnic outbidding’ and the 
debate regarding the merits of consociation. 
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• Given that the expressive rationale is well founded but not well defined, it is harder 
to make predictions based upon it. Hamlin and Jennings argue that emotions are 
likely to be extremely important when voters select leaders and strong emotions 
may result in the selection of extremists. This might imply the selection of 
extremists regardless of the institutional arrangements. An alternative prediction, 
also involving emotion, but which links expressive choice more closely with 
behavioural economics is that of Rabin (1993). He discusses how people are 
motivated to hurt those who are hurting them and help those who are helping them. 
They will do so even at some cost to themselves. Crucially, such emotional 
behaviour is more likely the lower the material costs. Voting in large groups is 
clearly a very low-cost activity given the very low probability of being decisive in 
determining the outcome of the election. So we might predict that moderates will 
be selected when the other group selects moderates and extremists will be selected 
when the other group selects extremists. So this might lead us to expect the voting 
behaviour to be symmetric. This prediction seems close to the bargaining and 
social psychological rationales where moderation or extremism on both sides can 
be expected depending on the degree of cooperation between groups. However, in 
this case the reason for this voting outcome is emotional rather than materialistic. 
This would imply either moderate selection or extremist selection on both sides 
independent of v or the nature of institutions. Furthermore, in the bargaining 
rationale symmetric selection of moderate leaders is only one of many potential 
equilibria that may emerge for 1 6 1 2v< < . 
We show three tables with recent election results for Northern Ireland. The first is for 
Westminster elections and the second is for local elections covering the same period. 
Showing the local elections meets the objection that showing only the Westminster 
results is selective as the results for it may reflect different voting motives. We start 
the series in 1983 as that was the first time Sinn Fein (SF) participated in elections.6 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The data can be found at http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ 
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Table 1: Westminster election results in Northern Ireland 1983-2005 
 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 
UUP 34 37.8 34.5 32.7 26.8 17.7 
DUP 20 11.7 13.1 13.6 22.5 33.7 
SDLP 17.9 21.1 23.5 24.1 21 17.5 
SF 13.4 11.4 10 16.1 21.7 24.3 
Alliance 8 10 8.7 8 3.6 3.9 
 
Table 2: Local election results in Northern Ireland 1985-2005 
 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 
UUP 29.5 31.3 29 28 23 18 
DUP 24.3 17.7 17 16 21 30 
SDLP 17.8 21 22 21 19 17 
SF 11.8 11.2 12 17 21 23 
Alliance 7 6.9 8 7 5 5 
 
Both tables demonstrate a clear and large swing in votes from the moderate UUP to 
the more extreme DUP and from the moderate SDLP to the more extreme SF. The 
centrist Alliance party has been increasingly squeezed. The change in voting patterns 
clearly accelerated after the 1998 Agreement. Results in the three elections for the 
Northern Ireland Assembly also show this swing. Indeed, in March 2007 the 
previously unthinkable happened and power sharing in Northern Ireland was restored 
with DUP providing the first minister and SF the second minister. 
 
Table 3: Assembly elections in Northern Ireland 1998-2007 
 1998 2003 2007 
UUP 21.2 22.7 14.9 
DUP 18.1 25.6 30.1 
SDLP 21.9 17 15.2 
SF 17.6 23.5 26.2 
Alliance 6.5 3.7 5.2 
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The recent literature on Northern Ireland is very large and the purpose of this section 
is not to review it. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to explore whether the four 
rationales we have outlined can provide an analytical framework towards answering 
two key questions. First, what has caused the swing to the extremes and second, is this 
a cause for concern? The rationales make some clear predictions with regard to these 
two questions and the task is to relate them to the Northern Ireland experience. 
At the heart of the recent debate on Northern Ireland is the consociational nature of 
the 1998 Agreement and the extent to which this has been a force for good through 
the creation of peace versus the extent to which consociation cements ethnicity, 
prevents integration and thus does not allow ‘normal’ politics to emerge. 
Consociational theory stems from Lijphart (1969). It takes group identity as given and 
devises a constitutional agreement that incorporates this fact. Four components are 
identified; an inclusive executive, a legislature elected by proportional representation, 
group autonomy where possible and minority vetoes on issues of vital interest. 
The facts of voting would seem to support those who fear increasing sectarianism. 
Voters have shifted towards relatively extreme parties. On the other hand, the facts 
‘on the ground’ clearly show that the war appears to be over and the 1998 Agreement 
would, one might think, have appeared to have played a large part in securing peace. 
Positive and negative (or at least guarded) views have been expressed on the merits of 
the 1998 Agreement. For a positive perspective see Mitchell, O’Leary and Evans 
(2001), McGarry and O’Leary (2005a), McGarry and O’Leary (2005b), Mitchell, 
Evans and O’Leary (2006) and Tilley, Evans and Mitchell (forthcoming). For a more 
guarded perspective see Taylor (2001), Horowitz (2001 and 2002) and Lutz and 
Farrington (2006).  
Crucial to the position that is taken in this debate is the extent to which one is 
concerned that the swing in the vote to the DUP and SF is a sign of increasing 
ethnicity and polarization as a result of hot-headed emotional attachment or rather that 
these parties are winning votes for cool rational reasons which do not necessarily 
imply a more polarized society. We now turn to the four rationales which provide an 
analytical framework in which we can analyse this debate. 
The bargaining rationale provides a logic for the selection of extremists and one that 
implies no welfare loss. It could be argued that pre-1998 voters on both sides of the 
conflict perceived a cost of conflict v that hawks on either side would be willing to 
incur but doves would not. Therefore the selection of moderates in the pre-1998 
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period was primarily to achieve peace and by choosing moderates they had 
coordinated on an efficient equilibrium. If either side had deviated and selected DUP 
or SF as their major party, the weak bargaining position presented by the UUP or 
SDLP would have necessitated the selection of a more extreme party even at the cost 
of conflict. Peace had to be negotiated by moderates and as soon as this was achieved, 
the median voters on either side realised the necessity of voting for extremists. So 
post-1998, conflict costs had been eliminated so there was no welfare loss attached to 
selecting extremists.  
Some objections could be made against the explanatory power of the bargaining 
rationale. First, the theory only works to the extent that there are unresolved issues 
that still require resolution and thus provide the incentive for the selection of hard-line 
negotiators. If the 1998 Agreement had closed all areas of negotiation this would be a 
valid criticism. However, we know that this was not the case. Key areas such as 
decommissioning, demilitarisation and policing were left unresolved so strong 
incentives were in place to select extremists post-1998. Second, while it is true that 
the DUP were not involved in negotiating the 1998 Agreement, SF were involved. 
This might cause us to review the sort of political equilibrium that existed pre-1998. 
One might argue that it was asymmetric such that the unionist community supported a 
more moderate set of representatives than the nationalist community. After 1998, the 
extremist equilibrium that is predicted comes to pass. Third, one might object that SF 
and DUP are not actually extreme. This point is repeatedly made in the papers which 
are positive with regard to consociation. They argue that DUP and SF are more 
moderate than is commonly perceived. However, it is still the case that they are more 
extreme than the rival parties within their community, so good strategic reasons exist 
for voting for them. 
Nonetheless, a difference in the bargaining rationale and recent literature on Northern 
Ireland electoral history is apparent. In the former, these parties would be attractive 
for the very reason that they are clearly identified as at the most extreme point 
possible in the political space. It is because both groups choose groups like this that 
moderate outcomes are secured. The Northern Ireland literature instead suggests that 
it is not just the outcome emergent from the interaction of DUP and SF that is 
moderate, but they are in actual fact more moderate than they used to be and this 
actual moderation is important in attracting voters and allowing peace to be secured. 
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The information rationale may help with explaining the changing vote patterns pre 
and post Agreement whilst recognising the possibility that the precise ideology of the 
political parties may be nebulous. Recall that the two key factors in determining 
incumbent party policy are the Hotelling effect and the expectations effect. 
Effectively, the former by moving to the centre ground increases votes and the latter 
by signalling the superiority of the other side’s policy approach loses votes. When the 
variance in party ideology is bigger than the variance in the mapping of policies into 
outcomes, then it makes electoral sense for hawks to implement more dovish policies 
and doves to implement more hawkish policies. The intuition is that the move towards 
dovishness by a hawk is more likely to be interpreted as a genuine increase in 
moderation within the party and because the variance of policies into outcomes is low, 
the expectation effect is reduced because the expectation is that dovish policies will 
generally lead to dovish outcomes which is less appealing for the median voter.  
This rationale arguably fits very well with recent Northern Ireland electoral history 
and would also address the seemingly moderate nature of DUP and SF as raised 
above. A plausible explanation for the decline in UUP support after 1998 is that they 
were a relatively dovish party, but with a large variance of internal ideology. 
Kaufmann and Patterson (2006) cover this in detail, but essentially a more hawkish 
wing of the party existed with Jeffrey Donaldson as its figurehead. It is also the case 
that although one might argue that there is some variation in terms of the mapping of 
policy into outcome, it would be hard to argue that this is large. These two factors 
would imply that pursuing a peace deal with SF was electoral suicide for UUP 
because the unionist electorate perceived the dove wing of the UUP to have become 
dominant thus rendering any agreement less credible. While the shift to the DUP after 
1998 could be explained by the bargaining rationale, arguably a further contributing 
factor was the defection of Donaldson and other prominent unionists from UUP to 
DUP in 2004. This confirmed the DUP as having a wide range of ideology and thus 
any subsequent move towards moderation could be interpreted as a genuine shift 
within party ideology. This clearly raises the attractiveness of voting DUP for middle 
of the road Unionists and any agreement they make is more credible. This story of 
defection does not really work for the shift in voters from SDLP to SF. Perhaps for SF 
and also for DUP (aided by defections from UUP) the moderate voices within each 
party found confidence compared to the 1980’s and created a perception that both 
parties contained a broader coalition of views than had once been thought. 
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In term of the consociation versus integration debate, the information rationale 
highlights that hawks may actually be necessary to create a lasting peace agreement 
and the bargaining rationale suggests that the selection of hawks should be seen as a 
rational response to the establishing of cooperative institutions. Neither theory implies 
welfare losses from consociation. The ‘social psychological rationale’ does pick up on 
this concern. By focussing on the competition that may exist over group identity it 
recognises sources of welfare loss not directly related to violence. Furthermore, the 
theory predicts moderate selection in a non-cooperative state and selection of 
extremists in the cooperative state. The pattern of voting certainly conforms to the 
predictions of the rationale, but is there evidence that the shift towards DUP and SF is 
related to stronger group identity and increasing polarisation. Some commentators 
suggest that this may well be the case. A powerful example is the coverage in the 
Economist (April 12th, 2006) in a piece entitled ‘Still Troubled: Northern Ireland 
staggers towards normality.’ The essence of the argument is that working class 
Protestant and Catholic are arguably even further apart than they were before 1998. 
They vote in large numbers for DUP and SF while middle-class abstention from 
voting is on the increase. This would suggest that, at least to some extent, the 1998 
Agreement has not resolved the conflict significantly and as integrationists might 
argue if anything, the consociational nature of the Agreement has stoked increased 
polarisation. The Economist (April 3rd, 2008) repeated its guarded approval on the 
tenth anniversary of the 1998 Agreement.7 
The expressive rationale could also be viewed as consistent with observed voting 
patterns and welfare losses. At first sight, the expressive rationale would seem to be 
undermined by the shifting voting pattern post 1998 as this seems clear evidence of 
voters engaging in instrumental strategic delegation.8 However, if we combine 
expressive voting with Rabin’s theory of fairness the move to the extremes could be 
viewed as a disturbing equilibrium where both sides are hurting the other by voting 
for extremists. Indeed, the Economist article suggests this as a motive for working 
                                                 
7 Indeed, throughout this paper care has been taken to use the term the 1998 Agreement. The naming of 
the Agreement is itself ironically (but perhaps not surprisingly) subject to disagreement in the two 
communities. Nationalists refer to the Good Friday Agreement, a section of Unionists refer to the 
Belfast Agreement and a further section of Unionists claim not to recognize the 1998 Agreement and 
refer instead to the 2006 St Andrews Agreement as this involved the participation of the DUP. 
8 Strategic voting is harder to justify when the paradox of voting is accepted. The idea of voters 
engaging in strategic delegation creates the clear demarcation between the social psychological and 
expressive rationales. 
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class Protestants voters. The welfare loss would exist because conflict costs are 
discounted by voters (as their vote is non-decisive) and conflict costs still exist in 
terms of the everyday interaction of the two communities even if organised political 
violence has been eradicated.  
Nonetheless, it is the last point that should cause us to resist concluding that the 
integrationist concern with consociation has proved correct. There has been no cross-
community, organised political violence since 1998. It could be argued that this has 
nothing to do with the 1998 Agreement since there had been very little political 
violence in the years preceding it as well. We would argue that this is not the case. 
The Agreement contained three strands. The first relates to the internal arrangements, 
in the spirit of the components outlined above such as an all-inclusive executive and a 
legislature elected by the single-transferable vote. Jennings (2007) argues that strands 
two and three have done much to create a cooperative atmosphere such that strand one 
is given room to operate. The second and third strands address external arrangements, 
the second relating to the North-South Ministerial Council and the third relating to the 
British-Irish Council. It could be argued that the North-South Ministerial Council is 
an important symbolic institution for the nationalist community and the British-Irish 
Council (an institution that brings together the states of the UK and Ireland alongside 
the devolved governments within the UK) is an important symbolic institution for the 
unionist community. In this sense, the 1998 Agreement could be viewed as an 
expressive constitution (Brennan and Hamlin (2002)), one in which the institutions 
created provide a continuing focus for expressive choice, but a choice that is more 
likely to achieve peace. This is because strands two and three have removed much of 
the heat from the conflict. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has outlined four rationales that provide differing explanations for why we 
may see dovish parties dominate voting under certain circumstances and why we 
might observe hawk parties dominate voting under a different set of circumstances. 
The information and bargaining rationales are more sanguine regarding the welfare 
implications of shifts from moderate to more extreme voting than the social 
psychological and expressive rationales. We apply the theories to voting patterns in 
Northern Ireland and consider the welfare implications. It would clearly seem to be 
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the case that Northern Ireland is in better shape now than before the 1998 Agreement, 
but some of the potential difficulties indicated in the social psychological and 
expressive rationales do seem to be borne out in practice. Nonetheless, the more 
positive perspective provided by the information and bargaining rationales would 
seem to win through and the idea that the popularity of DUP and SF is related to the 
fact that they are no longer viewed as having a fixed, extreme political standpoint 
provides support specifically for the information rationale. The contribution of this 
paper has been in the area of applied theory, but further exploration of the issues 
would benefit from data and future work might focus on survey questions which pin 
down more precisely exactly what has been motivating the voters (and non-voters) of 
Northern Ireland when making their electoral choice. This, in turn, would give us a 
clear idea of the extent to which we should be concerned about the increasing 
domination of DUP and SF. Furthermore, it would be instructive to investigate 
whether the rationales explored here could be applied to patterns of political support 
in other countries that have suffered ethnic violence and undergone constitutional 
reform. 
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